

Iran Hostage Crisis Classroom Set
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Shredded CIA Cable reporting on information provided by an Iranian contact

<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB21/04-01.htm>

When the United States embassy was overtaken by Iranian militants the employees of the embassy tried to destroy as much information as possible, usually by shredding. After the embassy was taken the Iranians put back together most of the shredded documents which contained names and important information given to the CIA by Iranian informants. This is just one example of what the Iranians put back together. Students may not know what this document is at first but it can be pulled into their narratives if teachers explain what it is after students have started the activity

A picture of the Ayatollah Khomeini escorted by military officers upon his return to Iran.

<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/publications/iran/irbroch.html>

This picture was taken when the Ayatollah returned to Iran with his Islamic fundamentalists and overthrew the shah's doctoral regime. The shah was not in Iran at the time. He was in the United States receiving treatment for cancer. This picture should give students insight into the fact that this man is important because he is surrounded by so many people.

Farsi Survival Guide from the 1980 Iran Hostage Rescue Mission

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/DOCUMENT/DOC-PIC/930728_1.gif

This was part of the survival kit given to Delta Force commandos during the failed rescue mission in April 1980. The statements were to be used to try to bring compassion to the commandos if they were captured or their helicopter was downed and they were trying to get out of Iran safely. Students should realize the importance of such a document to someone who would be lost in a foreign country and not know the common language.

The Hostages and the Casualties

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/list_of_hostages.phtml

This document is a list of all the hostages, released hostages, and Special Forces members who were involved directly in the Iranian Hostage Crisis. This document shows that these people were real, had families, and lets students understand that this tragedy could happen to anyone.

Letter from Jimmy Carter to Ayatollah Khomeini

http://arcweb.archives.gov/arc/digital_detail.jsp?&pg=1&rn=1&tn=595328&st=b&rp=details&nh=1

President Carter tried a diplomatic approach before signing off on the rescue mission that would eventually fail in April 1980. This letter is what he sent to the Ayatollah to try to end the hostage crisis but the Ayatollah did not give in and the hostages were not freed. This document should show students that proper communication lines were open between the countries during the crisis but even with this communication the hostages were not released.

Executive Summary of the Failed Mission to Rescue the Iranian Hostages

<http://arcweb.archives.gov/arc/servlet/arc.ControllerServlet?&pg=n&rn=1&nw=n&nh=1&st=b&rp=summary&si=0>

This is a summary of the planned mission to rescue the hostages from Iran. The summary gives timeframes of when the mission was planned and when it was to be conducted. The document also gives reasons for why the mission failed and best of all gives recommendations on how the United States should handle counter-terrorism actions in the future.

Robert C. Ode Diary

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/r_ode/

Robert C. Ode was the oldest of the hostages and actually retired from diplomatic service. He took a job to travel to Iran and only expected to be in Iran for a few months. He was allowed to keep a diary by his captors and this is a rare look into the mind of someone who lived through the ordeal.

SEP 79 13 05z

SECRET 21125Z SEP 79 STAFF
HONG KONG 62179

IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INF PRIORITY TEHRAN, TOKYO, BANGKOK.
IN L VBAT AJAJ INTEL

A. DIRECTOR 505513
B. TOKYO 85, 20

SECRET CONFUSION ON LOCATION "KIBISI," WHICH WAS PLACE NAME
TO C. FROM MAP AS SUBJECT REFS INDICATED AREA TO BE AVOIDED BY
IRAN GROUND TROOP. SUBJECT CLAIMED 1 SEP THAT GROUND ASSAULT
PS I QLD AVOID ENTIRE BORDER REGION FROM MANDALA SOUTH TO THE
IA I QLF GROUND FORCE INFILTRATION WOULD TAKE PLACE NORTH OF
L. THROUGH MOSTLY MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN.

E. 41-120-7 R/W VISEP99 DRW D9C.1

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Resource Sheet #3



<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/publications/iran/irbroch.html>

~~TOP SECRET~~

(#188)

1. Brother - Sister, I am a Moslem like you. I was an engineer in Mecca the home of (then I came to Iran. I was working in Kerman when revolution took place.

BARADAR - KHAHAK - MAN MESLE SHOMA MOSALMAN HASTAM. MAN MOHANDESE KHANEHE KHODA MACCA BUDAM. BE IRAN AMADAM. DAR KERMAN BUDAM KE ENGHELAB SHOD

2. A man took money from me to take me out of the country, but he brought me to Tehr He deceived me. Now I am alone without a place and food.

YEK MARD AZ MAN POOL GEREFT KE MARA KHAREI KONAD VALI OU MARA GOUL ZAD VA BE TEHR AYARD. KALA TANHA VA BE DUNE JA VA GAZA HASTAM.

3. I have a wife, 5 small children, an old mother and father. They are waiting for You may have children too. You have father and mother and you know how I feel,

MAN ZAN VA PANI BACH CHE KUCHAK MADAR VA PEDAR DARAM ANHA MONTAZERE MAN HASTA SHOMA HAM BACHCHE - MADAR VA PEDAR DAREED VA MIDANEED HALLE MARA

4. You Iranians and Moslems are famous for hospitality. For the sake of God help I need your help.

SHOMA IRANIHA VA MOSALMANHA BE MEHNAN NAVAZI MAARDOOF HASTEED. BE KHATERE KHODA MAN KONAK KONEED. NEED YOUR HELP.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classified By ~~FC5~~
Declassified ON: ~~OADR~~

Declassified by:
DDO NMLC

12 Aug 92

~~TOP SECRET~~

HELP	KOMAK
COME HERE	BIYA ENJA
DON'T MOVE	TA KAN NA KHOR
GET DOWN	BE KHAH
SIT DOWN	BEN SHEINID
STAND UP	BOLAND SHOW
PUT DOWN	BEGZAR ZAMIN
OPEN	BAZ
CLOSE	BAS TE
RIFLE	TOFANG
PISTOL	HAF TEAR
KNIFE	CHA GHO
AMMUNITION	FE SHANG
HAND GRENADE	NARENJAK
MACHINE GUN	MO SAL SAL
WE ARE BROTHERS	MA' BARADAR HAS TEAM
IMAM	EMAM
WHERE AM I	MAN KOJA HAS TAM
WHICH WAY IS	RAHE KOJAST
NORTH	SHOMAL
SOUTH	JO NOB
WEST	GHAHB
EAST	SHARGH
ROAD	RAH
TRAIN	GHATAR
BUS	AUTOBOS
TAXI	TAXI

~~TOP SECRET~~

تلف بیا اینجا
ان نخور بخواب
شینید بلندشو
زار زمین باز کن
تفنگ
صفت تیر چاقو
تنگ نارنجک
مال برادر منم
امام من کجا هستم
کجا است شمال
جنوب
غرب
شرق راه
نظار اتوبوس
اکسی

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Resource Sheet #5

The 52:

Thomas L. Ahern, Jr., 48, McLean, VA. Narcotics control officer.
Clair Cortland Barnes, 35, Falls Church, VA. Communications specialist.
William E. Belk, 44, West Columbia, SC. Communications and records officer.
Robert O. Blucker, 54, North Little Rock, AR. Economics officer specializing in oil.
Donald J. Cooke, 26, Memphis, TN. Vice consul.
William J. Daugherty, 33, Tulsa, OK. Third secretary of U.S. mission.
Lt. Cmdr. Robert Englemann, 34, Hurst, TX. Naval attaché.
Sgt. William Gallegos, 22, Pueblo, CO. Marine guard.
Bruce W. German, 44, Rockville, MD. Budget officer.
Duane L. Gillette, 24, Columbia, PA. Navy communications and intelligence specialist.
Alan B. Golancinski, 30, Silver Spring, MD. Security officer.
John E. Graves, 53, Reston, VA. Public affairs officer.
Joseph M. Hall, 32, Elyria, OH. Military attaché with warrant officer rank.
Sgt. Kevin J. Hermening, 21, Oak Creek, WI. Marine guard.
Sgt. 1st Class Donald R. Hohman, 38, Frankfurt, West Germany. Army medic.
Col. Leland J. Holland, 53, Laurel, MD. Military attaché.
Michael Howland, 34, Alexandria, VA. Security aide, one of three held in Iranian Foreign Ministry.
Charles A. Jones, Jr., 40, Communications specialist and teletype operator. Only African-American hostage not released in November 1979.
Malcolm Kalp, 42, Fairfax, VA. Position unknown.
Moorhead C. Kennedy Jr., 50, Washington, DC. Economic and commercial officer.
William F. Keough, Jr., 50, Brookline, MA. Superintendent of American School in Islamabad, Pakistan, visiting Tehran at time of embassy seizure.
Cpl. Steven W. Kirtley, 22, Little Rock, AR. Marine guard.
Kathryn L. Koob, 42, Fairfax, VA. Embassy cultural officer; one of two women hostages.
Frederick Lee Kupke, 34, Francesville, IN. Communications officer and electronics specialist.
L. Bruce Laingen, 58, Bethesda, MD. Chargé d'affaires. One of three held in Iranian Foreign Ministry.
Steven Lauterbach, 29, North Dayton, OH. Administrative officer.
Gary E. Lee, 37, Falls Church, VA. Administrative officer.
Sgt. Paul Edward Lewis, 23, Homer, IL. Marine guard.
John W. Limbert, Jr., 37, Washington, DC. Political officer.
Sgt. James M. Lopez, 22, Globe, AZ. Marine guard.
Sgt. John D. McKeel, Jr., 27, Balch Springs, TX. Marine guard.
Michael J. Metrisko, 34, Olyphant, PA. Political officer.
Jerry J. Miele, 42, Mt. Pleasant, PA. Communications officer.
Staff Sgt. Michael E. Moeller, 31, Quantico, VA. Head of Marine guard unit.
Bert C. Moore, 45, Mount Vernon, OH. Counselor for administration.
Richard H. Morefield, 51, San Diego, CA. U.S. Consul General in Tehran.
Capt. Paul M. Needham, Jr., 30, Bellevue, NE. Air Force logistics staff officer.
Robert C. Ode, 65, Sun City, AZ. Retired Foreign Service officer on temporary duty in Tehran.
Sgt. Gregory A. Persinger, 23, Seaford, DE. Marine guard.
Jerry Plotkin, 45, Sherman Oaks, CA. Private businessman visiting Tehran.
MSgt. Regis Ragan, 38, Johnstown, PA. Army noncom, assigned to defense attaché's officer.
Lt. Col. David M. Roeder, 41, Alexandria, VA. Deputy Air Force attaché.
Barry M. Rosen, 36, Brooklyn, NY. Press attaché.
William B. Royer, Jr., 49, Houston, TX. Assistant director of Iran-American Society.
Col. Thomas E. Schaefer, 50, Tacoma, WA. Air Force attaché.
Col. Charles W. Scott, 48, Stone Mountain, GA. Army officer, military attaché.
Cmdr. Donald A. Sharer, 40, Chesapeake, VA. Naval air attaché.
Sgt. Rodney V. (Rocky) Sickmann, 22, Krakow, MO. Marine Guard.
Staff Sgt. Joseph Subic, Jr., 23, Redford Township, MI. Military policeman (Army) on defense attaché's staff.
Elizabeth Ann Swift, 40, Washington, DC. Chief of embassy's political section; one of two women hostages.
Victor L. Tomseth, 39, Springfield, OR. Senior political officer; one of three held in Iranian Foreign Ministry.
Phillip R. Ward, 40, Culpeper, VA. Administrative officer.

Freed July 11, 1980, because of an illness later diagnosed as multiple sclerosis:

Richard I. Queen, 28, New York, NY. Vice consul.

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Six American diplomats avoided capture. For three months they were sheltered at the Canadian and Swedish embassies in Tehran. On Jan. 28, 1980, they fled using Canadian passports:

Robert Anders, 34, Port Charlotte, FL. Consular officer.
Mark J. Lijek, 29, Falls Church, VA. Consular officer.
Cora A. Lijek, 25, Falls Church, VA. Consular assistant.
Henry L. Schatz, 31, Coeur d'Alene, ID. Agriculture attaché.
Joseph D. Stafford, 29, Crossville, TN. Consular officer.
Kathleen F. Stafford, 28, Crossville, TN. Consular assistant.

Thirteen women and African-Americans were released on Nov. 19 and 20, 1979:

Kathy Gross, 22, Cambridge Springs, PA. Secretary.
Sgt. James Hughes, 30, Langley Air Force Base, VA. Air Force administrative manager.
Lillian Johnson, 32, Elmont, NY. Secretary.
Sgt. Ladell Maples, 23, Earle, AR. Marine guard.
Elizabeth Montagne, 42, Calumet City, IL. Secretary.
Sgt. William Quarles, 23, Washington, DC. Marine guard.
Lloyd Rollins, 40, Alexandria, VA. Administrative officer.
Capt. Neal (Terry) Robinson, 30, Houston, TX. Administrative officer.
Terri Tedford, 24, South San Francisco, CA. Secretary.
Sgt. Joseph Vincent, 42, New Orleans, LA. Air Force administrative manager.
Sgt. David Walker, 25, Prairie View, TX. Marine guard.
Joan Walsh, 33, Ogden, UT. Secretary.
Cpl. Wesley Williams, 24, Albany, NY. Marine guard.

Eight U.S. servicemen from the all-volunteer Joint Special Operations Group were killed in the Great Salt Desert near Tabas, Iran, on April 25, 1980:

Capt. Richard L. Bakke, 34, Long Beach, CA. Air Force.
Sgt. John D. Harvey, 21, Roanoke, VA. Marine Corps.
Cpl. George N. Holmes, Jr., 22, Pine Bluff, AR. Marine Corps.
Staff Sgt. Dewey L. Johnson, 32, Jacksonville, NC. Marine Corps.
Capt. Harold L. Lewis, 35, Mansfield, CT. Air Force.
Tech. Sgt. Joel C. Mayo, 34, Bonifay, FL. Air Force.
Capt. Lynn D. McIntosh, 33, Valdosta, GA. Air Force.
Capt. Charles T. McMillan II, 28, Corrytown, TN. Air Force.

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/list_of_hostages.phtml

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 6, 1979

Dear Ayatollah Khomeini:


Based on the willingness of the Revolutionary Council to receive them, I am asking two distinguished Americans, Mr. Ramsey Clark and Mr. William G. Miller, to carry this letter to you and to discuss with you and your designees the situation in Tehran and the full range of current issues between the U.S. and Iran.

In the name of the American people, I ask that you release unharmed all Americans presently detained in Iran and those held with them and allow them to leave your country safely and without delay. I ask you to recognize the compelling humanitarian reasons, firmly based in international law, for doing so.

I have asked both men to meet with you and to hear from you your perspective on events in Iran and the problems which have arisen between our two countries. The people of the United States desire to have relations with Iran based upon equality, mutual respect, and friendship.

They will report to me immediately upon their return.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Ayatollah Khomeini
Qom, Iran

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NSC 4/22/85 12 MC-84-10
BY 111 NARS, DATE 4/29/85

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Purpose

The purpose of this review is to improve US counterterrorist (CT) capability through an independent appraisal of the hostage rescue mission, including a broad examination of its planning, organization, coordination, direction, and control. The scope of the study addresses the broader aspects of conceptual validity and operational feasibility; the planning environment, including operations security (OPSEC), policy guidance, and options available; adequacy of planning, resources, preparation, and support; and overall conduct of the executed portion of the mission.

Mission

Rescue mission planning was an ongoing process from 4 November 1979 through 23 April 1980. The planners were faced with a continually changing set of circumstances influenced mainly by the uncertain intentions of the hostages' captors and the vacillating positions of the evolving Iranian leadership. The remoteness of Tehran from available bases and the hostile nature of the country further complicated the development of a feasible operational concept and resulted in a relatively slow generation of force readiness.

Analysis

In analyzing the planning, training, and execution of the hostage rescue mission, the review group identified 23 discrete issues that were investigated in depth. Eleven were considered to be major issues, ones that had an identifiable influence on the outcome of the hostage rescue effort or that should receive the most careful consideration at all levels in planning for any future special operation.

Issues

The major issues, which underlie the subsequent conclusions, are listed below:

OPSEC.

Independent review of plans.

Organization, command and control.

Comprehensive readiness evaluation.

Size of the helicopter force.

Overall coordination of joint training.

Command and control at Desert One.

Centralized and integrated intelligence support external to the Joint Task Force (JTF).

Alternatives to the Desert One Site.

Handling the dust phenomenon.

C-130 pathfinders.

Specific Conclusions

The major issues provide the basis for the following specific conclusions:

The concept of a small clandestine operation was valid and consistent with national policy objectives. It offered the best chance of getting the hostages out alive and the least danger of starting a war with Iran.

The operation was feasible. It probably represented the plan with the best chance of success under the circumstances, and the decision to execute was justified.

The rescue mission was a high-risk operation. People and equipment were called on to perform at the upper limits of human capacity and equipment capability.

The first realistic capability to successfully accomplish the rescue of the hostages was reached at the end of March.

OPSEC was an overriding requirement for a successful operation. Success was totally dependent upon maintaining secrecy.

Command and control was excellent at the upper echelons, but became more tenuous and fragile at intermediate levels. Command relationships below the Commander, JTF, were not clearly emphasized in some cases and were susceptible to misunderstandings under pressure.

External resources adequately supported the JTF and were not a limiting factor.

Planning was adequate except for the number of backup helicopters and provisions for weather contingencies. A larger helicopter force and better provisions for weather penetration would have increased the probability of mission success.

Preparation for the mission was adequate except for the lack of a comprehensive, full-scale training exercise. Operational readiness of the force would have benefited from a full-dress rehearsal, and command and control weaknesses probably would have surfaced and been ironed out.

Two factors combined to directly cause the mission abort: Unexpected helicopter failure rate and low-visibility flight conditions en route to Desert One.

The siting of Desert One near a road probably represented a higher risk than indicated by the JTF assessment.

General Conclusions

Although the specific conclusions cover a broad range of issues relating to the Terms of Reference, two fundamental concerns emerge in the review group's consensus which are related to most of the major issues:

The ad hoc nature of the organization and planning. By not utilizing an existing JTF organization, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had to start, literally, from the beginning to establish a JTF, create an organization, provide a staff, develop a plan, select the units, and train the force before the first mission capability could be attained. An existing JTF organization, even with a small staff and cadre units, would have provided an organization framework of professional expertise around which a larger tailored force organization could quickly coalesce.

OPSEC. Many things that, in the opinion of the review group, could have been done to enhance mission success were not done because of OPSEC considerations. The review group considers that most of these alternatives could have been incorporated without an adverse OPSEC impact had there been a more precise OPSEC plan selectively exercised and more closely integrated with an existing JTF organization.

Recommendations

These conclusions lead the group to recommend that:

A Counterterrorist Joint Task Force (CTJTF) be established as a field agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with permanently assigned staff personnel and certain assigned forces.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff give careful consideration to the establishment of a Special Operations Advisory Panel, comprised of a group of carefully selected high-ranking officers (active and/or retired) who have career backgrounds in special operations or who have served at the CINC or JCS levels and who have maintained a current interest in special operations or defense policy matters.

ACTUAL DIARY ENTRIES

Nov. 3, 1979. Went to Embassy residence in evening to see movie. After movie was told by Charge' that Consular Section was to be closed the next day so that the front could be repainted where demonstrators had painted slogans. I was surprised to receive this news as I had not heard about it elsewhere.

Nov. 4, 1979: Since I wasn't sure whether we were expected to work at the Consular Section, in view of what the Charge' had told me last evening, I went to the office just the same at 7:30 as I had quite a bit of work to do anyway. When I got there, however, I found that everyone was coming to work as usual but we were not open to the general public. About 9:00 I was in my office when a young American woman, apparently the wife of an Iranian, was shown into my office as she wanted to obtain her mother-in-law's Iranian passport that had been left at the Consular Section a day or so before for a non-immigrant visa. Just as I was talking to her in an attempt to find out to whom the passport had been issued, when it was left with us, etc., we were told by the Consul General to drop everything and get up to the second floor of the Consular Section. I really didn't know what was happening but was told that a mob had managed to get into the Embassy Compound and, for our own protection, everyone had to go upstairs immediately.

I noticed that the Consul General was removing the visa plates and locking the visa stamping machines. I went upstairs with the American woman and could see a number of young men in the area between the rear of the Consular Section and the Embassy CO-OP store. We were told to sit on the floor in the outer hallway offices. A Marine Security Guard was present and was in contact with the main Embassy building (Chancery) by walkie-talkie. After an hour or so we could hear that the mob, which turned out to be student revolutionaries, were also on the walkie-talkie. The Marine Guard then advised that we were going to evacuate the Consular Section.

There were some visitors on the second floor in the Immigrant Visa Unit and the American Services Unit. I was asked to assist an elderly gentleman, either an American of Iranian origin or an Iranian citizen, I don't know, since he was almost blind and was completely terrified, and to be the first one out of the building. When we got outside he was met by a relative who took him away in his car. The students outside the Consular Section appeared to be somewhat confused at that point and the Consul General and about four other American members of the Consular Section, of which I was one, started up the street with the intention of going to his residence. When we were about 1 ½ blocks from the Consular Section we were surrounded by a group of the students, who were armed, and told to return to the Compound. When we protested a shot was fired into the air above our heads.

It was raining moderately at the time. We were taken back to the Compound, being pushed and hurried along the way and forced to put our hands above our heads and then marched to the Embassy residence. After arriving at the residence I had my hands tied behind my back so

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tightly with nylon cord that circulation was cut off. I was taken upstairs and put alone in a rear bedroom and after a short time was blindfolded. After protesting strongly that the cord was too tight the cord was removed and the blindfold taken off when they tried to feed me some dates and I refused to eat anything I couldn't see. I strongly protested the violation of my diplomatic immunity, but these protests were ignored. I then was required to sit in a chair facing the bedroom wall. Then another older student came in and when I again protested the violation of my diplomatic immunity he confiscated my U.S. Mission Tehran I.D. card. My hands were again tied and I was taken to the Embassy living room on the ground floor where a number of other hostages were gathered. Some students attempted to talk with us, stating how they didn't hate Americans--only our U.S. Government, President Carter, etc. We were given sandwiches and that night I slept on the living room floor. We were not permitted to talk to our fellow hostages and from then on our hands were tied day and night and only removed while we were eating or had to go to the bathroom.

September 12, 1980: Today is Jerry's 42nd birthday. I had really fresh Barbari bread for breakfast today! Ate so much of it, with butter and honey, that I didn't want any lunch! Wish we could get it everyday. While we were playing Scrabble this afternoon, the student who apparently is in charge of us brought me some Sun and Ski Suntan lotion from the Embassy CO-OP but when I asked him if there was any mail (which he had said he would bring yesterday afternoon or today), he just said "No" with no other explanation.

This evening I expected that the cake I had asked the girls to make would be brought in to Jerry as a surprise. Instead one of the guards brought me a note asking what kind of a cake we wanted and said it would be made tomorrow. I was a bit disappointed that they didn't make it for his birthday today, as I wanted it as a surprise for him. However, there may have been some reason for not doing so but at least they are given our notes and this was the first time that I have been sure of it.

We are wondering whether there may be something going on, as we can hear the students using a power mower on the grass in the Compound and also from time to time we hear scraping sounds as though they are cleaning up junk outside. Don thinks that perhaps they are cleaning up the place in preparation for a visit by the International Red Cross or some other VIP's as we were asked to clean the library, etc. Perhaps this is just wishful thinking on our part and I don't really know what to make of it. In June, when Akbar took over as our Supervisor he told me that "he hoped" something would be decided about releasing us "at least by October" as that is when the students wanted to get back to the university, so sometimes I think possibly something may be working up toward releasing us by the beginning of early October. On the other hand, I think that perhaps we may be being kept until at least November 4, our Election Day in the U.S., just to embarrass the U.S. and possibly have some effect on the election as it seems to me that they ought to realize by this time they are not going to succeed in having the Shah returned nor having the Shah's money in the U.S. returned to them either, particularly to an Iranian Gov't as unstable as this one.

Again, all this may just be wishful thinking on my part and I surely hope that we will be released by November or even earlier as I dread to think of being here another Christmas! Even though they may be cleaning the place up a bit I'm sure they aren't going to remove all the signs they have written all over the walls everywhere in the Embassy Residence, the Chancery, etc., such as "Yankee Go Home--Yankee, you will *deid* in Iran--Down with the Carter; Masked Human Rights; Down with the Shah and Carter; etc." They want us to go home--yet they won't release us!

January 15, 1981 (439th Day)

Started off as another bad day! Hohman has made a number of snide comments lately--about my "pretending" to exercise, about his having to put up with my "shit" since last April (meaning my comments and opinions on various matters) and now this morning about my "bitching" concerning certain letters I receive when I get more mail than anyone else, etc. Seems this close

confinement brings out the true character in everyone and what used to be "joking" remarks have now turned into bitter, cutting ones. What he doesn't realize (or refuses to admit) is that he is one of the most opinionated individuals I have ever met and regards himself as a complete authority on most everything. I'm getting just as sick of his constant foul language as I'm sure he is getting sick of me and my ways. I'm also pretty tired of the others' constant reference to me as an "old man" or "gramps", or belittling me about my talking and the jokes I tell. While it appears to be meant as kidding, it too gets pretty caustic at times. So from here on, insofar as it possible, I'm not going to enter into any conversations expressing an opinion—or talk with Hohman about anything. Gave Col. Schaeffer a lesson in German pronunciation today. Jerry also acting strangely today, more or less accusing the rest of us of reading his mail! Why he would think any of us would be interested in doing that is more than I can imagine! This is a real happy ship!

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/r_ode/